Compassion and the Epistemology of Suffering Thresholds

In an attempt to get clearer, and less hyperbolic, about the value of suffering, I earlier suggested the idea of a suffering threshold, which is the “point” at which suffering loses its (positive) value and warrants easing. The idea of easing suffering leads directly to compassion/pity and this passage from section 338 of Nietzsche’s the Gay Science:

The whole economy of my soul and the balance effected by “distress,” the way new springs and needs break open, the way in which old wounds are healing, the way whole periods of the past are shed–all such things that may be involved in distress are of no concern to our dear pitying friends; they wish to help and have no thought of the personal necessity of distress, although terrors, deprivations, impoverishments, midnights, adventures, risks, and blunders are as necessary for me and for you as are their opposites. It never occurs to them that, to put it mystically, the path to one’s own heaven always leads through the voluptuousness of one’s own hell. No, the “religion of pity” (or “the heart”) commands them to help, and they believe that they have helped most when they have helped most quickly. (Kaufmann’s translation)

The last line in German is: “die ‘Religion des Mitleidens’ (oder ‘das Herz’) gebietet zu helfen, und man glaubt am besten geholfen zu haben, wenn man am schnellsten geholfen hat!” Kaufmann translates “‘Religion des Mitleidens’” as “‘religion of pity’”; however, the German “das Mitleid” can be translated as either “compassion” or “pity,” among other things. Perhaps nothing hangs on the difference between “compassion” and “pity.” However, Jeremiah Conway notes a possible difference of importance. In “A Buddhist Critique of Nussbaum’s Account of Compassion” he writes:

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Buddhism and Aristotle on the Appropriateness of Suffering Grief: A Further Mark Against Buddhism

In the well-known parable of the arrow, the Buddha responds negatively to the usefulness of answering certain metaphysical questions. The point that he makes is that they are not important for furthering the goal of alleviating dukkha (suffering/existential dissatisfaction):

Whether the view is held that the world is eternal or not, Malunkyaputta, there is still birth, old age, death, grief, suffering, sorrow and despair – and these can be destroyed in this life! I have not explained these other things because they are not useful, they are not conducive to tranquility and Nirvana. What I have explained is suffering, the cause of suffering, the destruction of suffering and the path that leads to the destruction of suffering. This is useful, leading to non-attachment, the absence of passion, perfect knowledge. (Found here. My emphasis.)

The Buddha seeks to live a full life, but one that eliminates suffering and the cycle of rebirths. Since the whole purpose of Buddhism is to alleviate suffering, it isn’t wrong to say that suffering has a negative value for Buddhists. This need not imply that it is never instrumentally valuable for the Buddhist; nevertheless, any instrumental value it has is to be transcended, ultimately leaving the suffering behind, negatively valued. For more detail on the value of suffering, see here and here.

Buddhism’s view of suffering and happiness is not as crude as Bentham’s, for whom pain varied only in intensity, duration, certainty/uncertainty, and propinquity/remoteness, but not quality: consider the difference between stubbing your toe, nausea, and the death of a loved one. Nevertheless, for both suffering is bad and happiness is good, even if “happiness” means very different things for each. An important difference between Buddhists and Bentham is that the Buddhists don’t understand all pleasures as being intrinsically valuable. They would presumably say the pleasure of meditating is positive (barring attachment to it), whereas the pleasure of heroin and a dozen donuts at one sitting is negative. Bentham, on the other hand, seems to say that when considering actions, it’s simply a matter of summing pleasure and summing pain, and if the balance is on the side of pleasure, then the act tends toward good and vice versa (See chapter IV of Bentham’s An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation).

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Some Thoughts on Greatness

Nietzsche and Wittgenstein are not ends. They are variously fodder, grist, ports in the storm, and storms to be sailed into. The same for epistemology, metaphysics, ethics, logic—for philosophy.

Living well is an end, a goal, though it is not a final point. It is more like a buoy in the open ocean—it can perhaps be reached, but vast openness, danger, and uncertainty lie beyond.

Greatness means overflowing with a multitude. One must, for example, have a multitude of projects, not just one. Therein lies a central difficulty, a great obstacle. It is difficult to produce one thing worthwhile, much less produce multiple. Here, too, we see the danger of the siren call of comfort—the need to welcome discomfort with open arms.

How is one to foster, to foment (after all, greatness can be dangerous) such a multitude? Surely a multitudinous diet. Hence, the danger of being a scholar.

Greatness is an end that does not require recognition from without. It also has contributory value in regard to living well, assuming living well doesn’t simply mean decadent-happiness.

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Nietzschean Thoughts on Black Friday

Today is “black Friday” and the masses are waiting in absurd lines, dealing with absurd crowds, rubbing elbows in fear and anticipation, waiting to fork out money on “deals,” hoping to buy things for their greedy friends, relatives, and children. Why? Because those desires, those wants, when satisfied by the material goods and gadgets will make them happy, finally, or bring them that much closer to ultimate and final satisfaction. Being the compassionate souls that we are, we want to make our friends and family happy.

Perhaps that was in part what Schopenhauer was getting at: we act as though we want ultimate satisfaction and without it we can’t be happy. We think that once we have, x, y, or z, we’ll finally have what we need to be happy. But, of course, we get x, y, AND z and we are still unsatisfied, either because it is not enough after all or because we have reached boredom. Happiness seems out of reach; ephemeral at best. But we don’t blame the process, the approach; we convince ourselves that we just haven’t found the right thing, person, or product.

Nietzsche taps into this process and inverts it. Happiness is the expression of power, an activity (no final state) of overcoming resistance that requires ultimatedissatisfaction. This is not power, not domination, over others. This “power” is best typified by the creative work of Beethoven and Goethe, and the never ending will to know of the philosopher who remains in perpetual dissatisfaction.
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The Monkey Swinging in the Way of Greatness

After teaching about Buddhism this past week and Nietzsche’s ideas on creativity and greatness, and after watching Limitless last night, the following thoughts came to me.

In the Will to Power, Nietzsche writes:

How does one become stronger?— By coming to decisions slowly; and by clinging tenaciously to what one has decided. Everything else follows.
The sudden and the changeable: the two species of weakness. (Section 918)

In Limitless, a creatively blocked writer takes a drug that allows him to utilize his brain more completely and efficiently. Part of that involves an intense ability to focus and make connections.

In mindfulness meditation—for example, where your attention is on your breath—it becomes clear how true it is that we naturally have “monkey mind.” Monkey mind is when one thought or idea leads to another, often only tangentially connected, thought or idea. For example, you have a pain in your lower back that reminds you of how uncomfortable your chair is at work, which makes you think of the project that’s due next Wednesday, which makes you think of the doctor’s appointment Wednesday, which makes you think of your sick uncle, which makes you think of that time he took you to the amusement park, which makes you think….

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Nietzschean Buddhism: An Experiment

I have long been drawn to Buddhism and to Nietzsche’s ideas. After much thought, I propose a reconciliation; I propose the creation of a Nietzschean Buddhism. How could this be a possibility? After all, the third noble truth of Buddhism is that there is a way out of suffering, and the fourth noble truth gives us the way out. Suffering is optional, as is staying in samsara, the eternal recurrence of rebirth and a life of suffering. How is that reconcilable with Nietzsche, who writes:

You want, if possible—and there is no more insane “if possible”—to abolish suffering.  And we?  It really seems that we would rather have it higher and worse than ever. Well-being as you understand it—that is no goal, that seems to us an end, a state that soon makes man ridiculous and contemptible—that makes his destruction desirable  (Beyond Good and Evil, 225).

Yet it is exactly along the lines of the value of suffering that a most fruitful reconciliation is possible. I want to sketch out a way in which Buddhism and Nietzsche’s thought can combine along the lines of the value of suffering, the nature of compassion, the importance of psychology, and the role of mindfulness. I will not address all of these issues here. Those that I don’t will be addressed later.

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The Value of Suffering and the Importance of Suffering Thresholds

In an earlier essay I raised some questions about the value of suffering, especially the default assumption that suffering is to be avoided and brought to a quick end when it does occur. In Nietzsche’s writing we find claims that suffering has instrumental value and intrinsic value, or at least it will to the higher types of human beings who have the appropriate will. Here I want to consider the claim that suffering has instrumental value and what that means for our attitudes towards our and other’s suffering.

Nietzsche’s remarks about suffering might lead one to think that an endorsement of his views would imply that we shouldn’t try to end suffering ever. For example, in the Gay Science, Nietzsche writes:

The whole economy of my soul and the balance effected by “distress,” the way new springs and needs break open, the way in which old wounds are healing, the way whole periods of the past are shed–all such things that may be involved in distress are of no concern to our dear pitying friends; they wish to help and have no thought of the personal necessity of distress, although terrors, deprivations, impoverishments, midnights, adventures, risks, and blunders are as necessary for me and for you as are their opposites. It never occurs to them that, to put it mystically, the path to one’s own heaven always leads through the voluptuousness of one’s own hell. No, the “religion of pity” (or “the heart”) commands them to help, and they believe that they have helped most when they have helped most quickly. (Part of Section 338. Kaufmann translation.)

However, I do not think that Nietzsche here or elsewhere claims that all instances of suffering have instrumental value—but regardless, we needn’t think that they do.

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Why Not Suffering? Buddhism, Nietzsche, and the Value of Suffering

The cessation of suffering is Buddhism’s end goal. The Buddha has discovered how to do it, according to Buddhism and Buddhists who have achieved the goal. A supposedly central requirement for achieving the goal is to realize the truth of no-self: there is no substantial self that endures over time. Leaving aside what exactly this means, an important question regards why one should accept the doctrine of no-self. The Buddha gave arguments for the view and later Buddhists gave still more.

Here is the important point: these arguments are philosophical arguments just as susceptible to objections and problems as any philosophical argument. Faced with such a difficulty, faced with the wide morass that is the debate about no-self, a Buddhist practitioner may claim that the convoluted metaphysics of persons is not what matters. What matters is whether the Buddha’s method of ending suffering works. Belief in no-self can come through practicing selflessness over time—by seeing the results of selflessness, i.e., the lessoning/ending of suffering. It needn’t come as the result of an argument.

Here is the problem: belief in no-self may lead to less suffering, may even lead to its complete cessation, but that doesn’t mean that there isn’t a substantial self. It just means that belief in a substantial self likely leads to suffering. If giving up the belief in a substantial self did help to end suffering, then that would certainly give credence to the overall method of the Buddha. That is, it would mean that he was right that his eightfold path will bring an end to suffering. But, again, that doesn’t mean that he was right about there not being a self. Again, it only means that he was right that giving up the belief in such a self will help end suffering.

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The Need for Outspoken Outrage and Disgust

A few people I’ve been close to have been very critical by nature, easily outraged and disgusted by the actions and character of those around them. It was this that caused one of them to leave Facebook recently. He couldn’t see the point in engaging in something that was bringing forth so much bile. However, none of the people I’ve known have been as vociferously outspoken as Wittgenstein was personally or Nietzsche in writing. All of this raises two interesting questions. First, is there something of greater value in being more sensitive to opportunities of indignation, as opposed to being “easy going” in the oblivious sense? Second, if there is greater value in it, does that mean that one should be more willing to express it? Should you merely feel indignant or should you readily express indignation?

The value of being sensitive to the outrageous and disgusting can be assessed along two lines—the value to oneself and to others. Presumably, if you are more sensitive to the follies and evils of others, then you will regularly be swimming in unpleasant emotions. You might either flourish in such waters or find them drowning your happiness, depending on your nature. Thus, such sensitivity could be seen as valuable or disvaluable.

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Some Thoughts on Living with Pain

Pleasure and pain are as intriguing as they are dangerous. They are with us from the beginning and experienced daily, yet I don’t think many of us understand them very well. Most basically they are tools, very primitive ones. If you feel pain, then that is often a good sign that you should try to stop what you’re doing. We can’t necessarily say the same thing reversed about pleasure. Pleasure is a less discriminating tool than pain. And that is not to say that there aren’t times when pain fails to accurately suggest cessation.

So pleasure typically reinforces behavior and pain discourages it. As a species we still exist in large part because we can’t help ourselves when it comes to sex and stuffing our faces with available sugars, fats, and salts—much to the joy of STIs and McDonald’s.

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